I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a family of experimental methods that exploit quantum optics to realize the task of secret key expansion [1] [2] [3] . Early works on QKD were defined within a discrete-variable (DV) architecture, where information is encoded in discrete degrees of freedom (e.g., polarization, phase delay, etc.) of a single photon or weak coherent pulse. This requires single-photon detectors at the measurement stage. Later works introduced continuous-variable (CV) architectures, where information is encoded in a continuous way in the quadratures of the electromagnetic field, and homodyne and heterodyne detection can be utilized at the measurement stage [4] . The fact that CV QKD utilizes homodyne or heterodyne detection, which are mature detection techniques routinely deployed in optical communications, is considered to be one of the main strategic advantage of CV QKD over DV QKD [2] .
Whereas CV QKD may offer technological advantages, obtaining security proofs for CV QKD protocols is known to be a particularly challenging task. The first complete and rigorous security proofs were obtained by Furrer et al. in Ref. [5] and by Leverrier in Refs. [6, 7] . Ref. [5] considered a protocol where Alice prepares squeezed states and Bob measures by homodyne detection, and the security proof was obtained by applying entropic uncertainty relations. Refs. [6, 7] (see also Ref. [8] ) considered a protocol where Alice prepares coherent states whose amplitudes are sampled i.i.d. from a Gaussian distribution, and Bob measures by heterodyne detection [9] . More recently, promising proof strategies have been introduced for protocols where Alice samples coherent states from a discrete amplitude distribution [10, 11] .
This paper focuses on the protocol with Gaussian distribution of input coherent states and heterodyne detection in output of Refs. [6, 7, 9] . I anticipate that the results presented here may be extended to other protocols, such as two-way [8, 12] and measurement-device independent protocols [13] [14] [15] . Here I focus on the problem of proving the security against collective attacks, in the non-asymptotic, finite size regime.
Here I will combine the approaches of Ref. [6] and Ref. [16] with some new ideas. I will explicitly account for experimental imperfections and for the fact that the mathematical models do not always match the experimental implementation of CV QKD. My goal here is not to present a fully rigorous mathematical proof, but to outline a way to assess the security of CV QKD that is as rigorous as possible, given current experimental limitations and our mathematical toolbox. This approach will uncover hidden assumptions, and in part bridge the gap between mathematical models and experiments.
The paper develops as follows. Section II clarifies the relation with previous works on the same subject. Section III reviews the ideal protocol of Ref. [9] . Section IV presents two main discrepancies between ideal CV QKD and its experimental realizations, and Section V presents a particular realization of CV QKD protocol, of which I present a security analysis. Section VI reviews the main theoretical tools utilized, and Section VII presents the security analysis. Conclusions are presented in Section VIII.
II. RELATION WITH PREVIOUS WORKS
This work focuses on the CV QKD protocol first introduced by Weedbrook et al. in Ref. [9] . The security analysis closely follows the security proof of Ref. [6] . The new ingredient with respect to Ref. [6] (and Ref. [17] ) is the treatment of imperfections in state preparation.
To deal with non-ideal state preparation, I will exploit the continuity of the quantum mutual information, an idea that was already presented in Ref. [16] . The main difference with Ref. [16] is that my analysis is developed in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, a fact that simplifies the theory and may yield tighter bounds on the key rate. Furthermore, Ref. [16] only considered asymptotic security, whereas here I am including finite-size corrections.
Finally, as noted in Ref. [16] the continuity of the quantum mutual information requires to estimate some parameters of a state that is not physically accessible. This ambiguity is in part removed here as I sidestep it by using a physical argument. This argument builds on the fact that ideal heterodyne detection is only an approximate description of its experimental implementation. The fact that I approach this problem using a physical argument instead of a mathematical theorem is the most important difference with respect to previous works.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE IDEAL PROTOCOL
This section reviews the main steps of the CV QKD protocol as it would be ideally implemented, i.e., using ideal experimental devices. I will do this with the help of the familiar fictional characters Alice (the authenticated sender of quantum signals), Bob (the authenticated receiver), and Eve (the eavesdropper). The protocol is essentially the one first proposed by Weedbrook 
Physically, N represents the mean photon number in the input states.
The ensemble of input coherent states prepared by Alice on system A is represented by a bipartite state,
where P 0 (α) = 1 πN e −|α| 2 /N ,
d 2 α = 1 2 dq A dp A , and |u α is a dummy quantum state that carries the value of α. The latter is represented as the random variable X 2. Quantum communication. Alice sends the coherent state to Bob through an untrusted quantum communication channel that may be controlled by Eve.
The action of the quantum channel on system A is described as an isometry transformation U A→BE that broadcasts quantum information to Bob (B) and Eve (E). This is represented by the tripartite state,
where ψ 0 BE (α) is the joint state of Bob and Eve for given α.
Measurement. Bob measures the received signal
by ideal heterodyne detection. The measurement outcome is a pair of real numbers, denoted as q B , p B , that can be represented as a complex number
The correlations between α, β an Eve's quantum side information are described by the state
where |v β is a dummy quantum state that carries the value of β, which is turn represented by the random variable Y , ψ 0 E (α, β) is Eve's state conditioned on α and β, and P 0 (α, β) = P 0 (α)P 0 (β|α) is the joint probability.
A quantity of particular interest is the covariance matrix of the quadratures:
where
for any function F . The above three steps need to be repeated n times. After that, Alice and Bob post-process their local raw data to extract a secret shared key of ℓ bits.
Given the physical parameters that characterize the protocol, including the noise and loss associated with the communication channel, the value of n is one of the factors that determine how many secret key bits can be generated. For typical noise and loss values, n could be as large as 10 8 − 10 12 [6, [17] [18] [19] [20] . This strongly depends on loss, noise, and on the required standard of security.
The classical post-processing includes the routines of parameter estimation, error reconciliation, and privacy amplification. Here we assume that Alice reconciles her raw data with Bob (reverse reconciliation). In order to do this efficiently, Alice and Bob need to apply an Analog to Digital Converter (ADC) to discretize the variables X and Y . We denote asX andȲ the discretized variables.
The ADC is characterized by its range R and number of output bits. For example, it is defined by a set of d non overlapping intervals, with d equal to the cardinality |Ȳ | ofȲ ,
for j = 1, . . . , d − 2, and
with δ = 2R/(d − 2). To each pair of intervals we associate a unique amplitude value β jk = (q Bj + ip Bk )/ √ 2, where q Bj = −R + jδ and p Bk = −R + kδ.
Finally, we obtain a description of the state of Bob and Eve after the ADC
where I j × I k denotes the set of values of β such that q Bj ∈ I j and q Bk ∈ I k .
IV. DEVIATIONS FROM THE IDEAL PROTOCOL
This section presents a (not exhaustive) list of main discrepancies between the ideal protocol and how it is experimentally implemented. This will focus on how state preparation and measurement are modelled in the security proof of CV QKD.
A. Deviation from ideal quantum state preparation
This accounts for the fact that is not physically possible to sample coherent states with a Gaussian distribution of their amplitudes. This is because any physical device operates within a finite range and finite resolution.
In any physical realization of the protocol Alice samples the coherent state amplitudes from a discrete and bounded distribution. A known way to assess the security of the protocol with discrete amplitude modulation is to consider the statistical distance between the average input states of the ideal and practical protocols [17] . In the ideal protocol, the average stage prepared by Alice is
The state ρ 0 is in fact a thermal state with N mean photons.
In practice, Alice draws the coherent state amplitudes from some discrete and bounded ensemble, {p(j), α j } j=1,...,ν , where p(j) is the probability of the complex amplitude α j . Therefore, the average input state of a practical protocol reads:
To compare the ideal with the experimental state preparation step we consider the trace distance:
We recall that the trace distance quantifies the probability of successfully discriminating the two states (see, e.g., Ref. [14] ). A bound on the trace distance of the form D(ρ, ρ 0 ) ≤ ǫ (1) implies that any attempt to distinguish ρ from ρ 0 succeeds with probability no larger than ǫ (1) .
Because the protocol requires the preparation of n signals, we are in fact interested in the trace distance D(ρ ⊗n , ρ 0 ⊗n ) between n identical copies of ρ and ρ 0 . This is related to the single-copy trace distance through the inequality D(ρ ⊗n , ρ 0 ⊗n ) ≤ nD(ρ, ρ 0 ). Therefore, the practical protocol is indistinguishable from the ideal one up to a probability smaller than ǫ (n) = nǫ (1) . Note that this failure probability grows linearly with n.
In terms of security, if the ideal protocol is proven secure, then the practical protocol is secure up to a probability smaller than ǫ (n) . We want this failure probability to be sufficiently small. For example, some authors put the overall security failure probability in a range between 10 −10 [17] [18] [19] and 10 −20 [6] . Putting this together with the fact that n may be in the range of 10 8 − 10 12 , we obtain that ǫ (1) needs to lay somewhere between 10 −18 and 10 −32 . Obviously, achieving this would require a level of experimental control that is hardly seen in experimental practice.
B. Deviation from ideal heterodyne detection
This accounts for the fact that any physical device that implements Bob's measurement has finite range. Whereas the output of ideal heterodyne detection is unbounded.
In principle one could address this issue as for the previous one, i.e., by introducing a notion of statistical distance between ideal heterodyne detection and its practical implementation. However, it is not obvious how this can be done without making assumptions on the attack implemented by Eve. This is a most important issue because it affects the cornerstone of the security proofs for CV QKD protocol, i.e., the optimality of Gaussian attacks [21, 22] . This important results, which will be reviewed in the Section VI, only holds for ideal heterodyne detection. It is not clear how it could be extended or adapted to finite-range non-ideal heterodyne.
V. DESCRIPTION OF A PRACTICAL PROTOCOL
We consider a specific experimental scheme for quantum state preparation, where Alice prepares coherent states drawn from a finite set. Consider a set of d non overlapping intervals:
for j = 0, . . . , d − 1, with δ = 2M/d. To each pair of these intervals we associate a unique complex number α jk = (q Aj + ip Ak )/ 
which can be compared with its counterpart σ 0 XA for the ideal protocol in Eq. (1), using, for example, the trace distance D(σ XA , σ 0 XA ). For simplicity, assume that P (α) = κP 0 (α) if α ∈ D, and P (α) = κP 0 (α) = 0 otherwise, with κ > 1 the normalization factor. In this case we can directly compute
From now on we assume D(σ XA , σ 0 XA ) = ǫ p ≪ 1. We also define the states σ XBE and σ XY E for the practical protocol in the same way as we have done for the ideal protocol. We have
and
where P (α, β) is the joint probability of Alice and Bob. Note that this is different from P 0 (α, β) because of the different state preparation routines. It follows from the monotonicity of the trace distance under completely positive maps that
This bound also applies to the joint probability distributions,
and to the reduced states of Eve and Bob, also after the application of the ADC:
Finally, we define the covariance matrix for the practical protocols,
with F (Q j , Q k ) P = d 2 αd 2 βP (α, β)F (Q j , Q k ). Comparing this with the covariance matrix γ 0 in Eq. (5), note that this is defined using the probability distribution P instead of P 0 .
VI. MAIN THEORETICAL TOOLS APPLIED IN THIS WORK
This section reviews the main theoretical tools applied for the security analysis presented in Section VII.
The leftover hash lemma establishes a link between the min-entropy of a random variableȲ and the amount of uniform randomness that can be extracted from it [23] . Consider the bipartite state,
that describes the correlations between a classical random variableȲ and a quantum system E. The latter may represent the quantum system under the control of the eavesdropper Eve. Here pȲ (y) is the probability thatȲ takes value equal to y, and {|y } is a collection of orthogonal unit vectors that carry the values ofȲ . The minentropy ofȲ conditioned on E, denoted as H min (Ȳ |E), quantifies the probability of guessing the value ofȲ from measuring the system E. In fact, the optimal probability of guessing is p guess = 2 −Hmin(Ȳ |E) . The leftover hash lemma states that, for any integer ℓ ǫ h such that
it is possible to extract fromȲ a string of ℓ ǫ h random bits that are uniform and secret to Eve, up to a probability smaller than ǫ h . Here we consider the smooth min-entropy, H ǫs min (Ȳ |E), which is computed on a state ρ ǫs Y E that is ǫ s -close to ρȲ E [24, 25] . We then have the bound
on the length ℓ ǫ h +ǫs of a bit string that can be considered uniform and secret to Eve up to a probability smaller than ǫ h + ǫ s . The Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) allows us to estimate the smooth min-entropy in terms of the Shannon entropy. In fact, the two quantities coincides in the thermodynamic limit. For n i.i.d. instances of the random variableȲ , the following bound holds [25] H ǫs
where ∆(ǫ s , |Ȳ |) is a function of the smoothing parameter ǫ s and of the cardinality |Ȳ | of the random variableȲ , with [14] ∆(ǫ s , |Ȳ |) ≤ 4
Continuity of the quantum mutual information. Several inequalities exist that bound the value of quantum entropies in the neighbour of a given quantum states, see e.g. Refs. [26] [27] [28] [29] . Here we apply an inequality for the quantum mutual information as presented in Ref. [29] .
Consider a pair of bipartite states, ρȲ E , ρ 0 Y E , on quantum systemsȲ and E. If
where I(Ȳ ; E) denotes the quantum mutual information, with [29] f
Note that this bound is independent on the dimension of E, which can also be infinite.
The optimality of Gaussian attacks is a property of protocols where Alice prepares coherent states with a Gaussian amplitude distribution, and Bob measures by ideal heterodyne detection. This property established that, for given covariance matrix of Alice's and Bob's variables, the optimal attack for Eve is a Gaussian attack. This is summarized by the inequality
where σ G is a Gaussian state having the same covariance matrix as σ 0 , and Y denotes the random variable associated with the outcome of ideal heterodyne measurement. The important point that I want to emphasize here is that the theorem holds for the ideal protocol where Alice prepares a Gaussian distribution of coherent states and Bob applies ideal heterodyne. See Refs. [21, 22, 30] for more detail.
VII. A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO ASSESS THE SECURITY OF CV QKD
In this Section, I outline an approach to assess the security of the CV QKD protocol described in Section III, assuming the particular practical implementation of Section V. The first two subsections focus on imperfect state preparation and non-ideal heterodyne detection. The third subsection briefly touches on the issue of parameter estimation.
A. The issue with discrete input modulation For n signal transmissions we are interested in finding a lower bound on the conditional smooth min-entropy
whereȲ n denotes n instances of the Bob's discretised heterodyne output. The min-entropy can then be used to bound the secret key rate through the leftover hash lemma, see Section VI. As we assume collective attacks, the joint state of Bob and Eve is a tensor product, σ ⊗n . By applying the AEP we obtain, see Eq. (28),
where the second equality follows from the identity H(Ȳ |E) σ = H(Ȳ ) σ − I(Ȳ ; E) σ . Note that, from the measurement data, Bob can empirically estimate the entropy H(Ȳ ), see Ref. [6] .
We now relate the mutual information I(Ȳ ; E) σ , which refers to the practical protocol, to the mutual information I(Ȳ ; E) σ 0 that would be obtained with the ideal protocol. Using the condition in Eq. (23) and the continuity bound on the mutual information in Eq. (30), we obtain
Putting this in Eq. (35) we finally obtain
B. The issue with non-ideal heterodyne detection and the optimality of Gaussian attacks The next step is to relate the discrete and bounded variableȲ with the continuous and unbounded variable Y that would be obtained with ideal heterodyne detection. Note that the ADC Y →Ȳ defines a completely positive map, therefore we can apply the monotonicity property of the quantum mutual information to obtain
Putting this in Eq. (37) we obtain
We can now apply the property of optimality of Gaussian attacks. In fact, the mutual information I(Y ; E) σ 0 is defined for the variable Y that is the output of ideal heterodyne detection, and is computed on the state σ 0 that is generated for the ideal state preparation. We can then insert Eq. (32) into (39) and obtain
where σ G is a Gaussian state that has the same covariance matrix as σ 0 . Unlike I(Y ; E) σ 0 , the Gaussian mutual information I(Y ; E) σG is uniquely determined by the covariance matrix of σ 0 , i.e., the quantity defined in Eq. (5) . The problem is that the state σ 0 is neither prepared nor measurement in the laboratory. The only state that is physically accessible is σ. So we are in the position of having to estimate the covariance matrix of σ 0 from measuring σ.
The fact that these two states are ǫ p -close in trace distance is, in general, not sufficient to bound the difference between their covariance matrices, see Ref. [16] . This is essentially due to the fact that the variable Y is unbounded.
Here I sidestep this problem using a physical argument instead of a mathematical one. In fact, the range of any experimental realization of heterodyne is limited by saturation and non-linear effects. This means that Bob can only measure values of the quadratures q B , p B within a finite range R = [−R, R] × [−R, R]. Physically, it does not make sense to make a statement about the covariance matrix of ideal heterodyne, as no ideal heterodyne can ever be realized experimentally. Therefore, I will ask the physically well-defined question: what would be the covariance matrix, on state σ 0 , given practical heterodyne?
To address this question, we can compare it with the covariance matrix obtained from the state σ, which is the one that is experimentally accessible.
Consider for example the quadrature q B and compare the mean values q 2 B P and q 2 B P 0 , which refer to the practical and ideal protocol, respectively. We have
where the second inequality follows from the fact that the q B ∈ [−R, R], and the last inequality follows form Eq. (21) . The same bound applies to the quadrature p B . Similarly, we can bound the cross covariance terms.
Consider for example q A q B P and q A q B P 0 , we have:
where inequality (48) is obtained using the fact that P (α, β) = 0 if |q A | > M , and we have defined, using Eq. (2),
In a similar way we can bound all the other cross covariance terms, q A p B P 0 , p A q B P 0 , and p A p B P 0 .
C. Parameter estimation
Once we have established the relation between the covariance matrix of the physically accessible state σ and that of the counterfactual state σ 0 , the next step is to determine a confidence interval for the said covariance matrix.
This can be done, for example, by exploiting the central limit theorem [31, 32] , under the assumption of a Gaussian attack [14] (this is supported by the results on the optimality of Gaussian attacks among coherent attacks [7] ), or in full generality under the only assumption of collective attacks [6] . All these approaches are essentially based on the assumption that Alice and Bob implement the ideal protocol.
Here I will instead assume the practical protocol with discrete input coherent state modulation and imperfect heterodyne detection. This allows us to apply standard tail bounds, e.g., the Hoeffding bound [33] .
Consider for example the quantity q 2 B σ and its empirical estimate 1 m m j=1 q 2 Bj , where q Bj , for j = 1, . . . , m denote the outputs of Bob's measurements. Using the fact that, in a real experiment, the values of q B , q Bj ∈ [−R, R] are limited by the finite range of Bob's measurement, the Hoeffding bound yields:
Pr
That is, if we require one of these probabilities to be smaller than ǫ, then δ = R 1 m ln 1 ǫ . Similarly we obtain a confidence interval for p 2 B σ . Consider now the cross covariance terms, for example q A q B σ , which is empirically estimated by 
or, if we take ǫ as independent variable, δ = RM m ln 1 ǫ . In the same way we obtain confidence intervals for the other cross-diagonal terms in the covariance matrix, q A p B σ , p A q B σ , and p A p B σ .
These confidence intervals might not be optimal but are consistent with the properties of a practical, nonideal, implementation of CV QKD.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This work explored and partially bridged the gap between theoretical security proofs and experimental im-plementations of CV QKD. Unlike other works, I make use of both mathematical tools and physical arguments. The result is a security analysis that is as rigorous as it can be, given the theoretical tools we have in our toolbox and the limitations of experimental practice. I hope this work may be useful to experimental researchers who want to make sense of the security of CV QKD.
I have discussed some of the discrepancies between mathematical models and experimental realizations of CV QKD. On one hand, we have elegant mathematical theorems that exploit symmetries in infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, see e.g. Refs. [6, 7, 21, 34] . On the other hand, we have the experimental practitioners dealing with noisy devices and limited resources [17] . In principle, one expects the mathematical models to be meaningful approximations of physical reality, whose scope is to guide the experimental work. In CV QKD, I see the risk that the experimenter might be faced with the overwhelming task of having to reproduce the mathematical models with unrealistic levels of confidence. If this is the case, the models may lose their usefulness to physics. This work represents an attempts to highlight and hopefully mitigate this risk.
Some CV QKD protocols and approaches to security proof are especially promising as they put less burden on the experimentalist. Examples include protocols that, by definition, require a finite constellation of input coherent states [10, 11, [35] [36] [37] , and security proofs that exploit entropic uncertainty relations without invoking the property of optimality of Gaussian attacks [5, 38, 39] .
